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WHY DO FIRMS EMPLOY FOREIGNERS ON THEIR TOP MANAGEMENT 
TEAMS? A MULTILEVEL EXPLORATION OF INDIVIDUAL AND FIRM 
LEVEL ANTECEDENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In Europe, in particular, the number of foreigners appointed to top management teams 
has increased significantly over the past decade. However, the question of why some 
firms elect to employ foreign nationals on their top management teams remains unclear. 
This study utilizes a multi-level methodology to test the degree to which employment of a 
foreigner on the top management team is driven by individual level human capital 
characteristics versus firm level strategic considerations. Results from empirical tests on a 
sample of Swiss publicly listed companies suggest that degree of international 
diversification is positively associated with the likelihood of having a foreign executive, 
whereas human capital characteristics do not explain the propensity to employ a foreigner 
on the top management team. Further analyses indicate that nationality diversity at the 
board level, as well as the international experience of the top management team, are 
possible predictors of the probability of having a foreigner on the top management team. 
 
 
Keywords: top management teams, human capital, firm internationalization, foreigners, 
upper echelons, boards of directors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The success of international business firms depends on their ability to manage diverse 
cultural, institutional and competitive environments, to coordinate geographically 
dispersed resources, and to leverage innovations across national and regional borders 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hitt, Hoskisson and Kim, 1997). The ongoing globalization 
poses significant challenges to the upper echelons of organization due to the increase in 
complexity of the managerial decision-making environment (Sanders and Carpenter, 
1998). As a result, companies search for different ways to enhance the decision-making 
capacity at the firm upper echelons and internationalize their top management teams 
(TMT) as a source of knowledge and expertise about managing firm foreign operations.  
The importance of having top managers, who know and understand the logic and 
dynamics of firm foreign markets has been addressed for a long time among researchers 
and practitioners (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Luo, 2005). Extensive experience from a 
particular country helps a manager to better understand the local market and institutions 
and to make sound managerial decisions (Kobrin, 1984). However, international 
assignment experience is often limited in time and regional scope and thus also limited in 
its impact.  Instead, Perlmutter and Heenan (1974) suggest the use of foreign nationals as 
top managers. With the increasing globalization, foreign-born managers have become 
more prevalent among the ranks of business leaders (Business Week, 1998; Staples, 
2007; van Veen and Marsman, 2008). A recent study explored the international market 
for executive labor in Europe and concluded that except for Denmark and Norway, 
European MNCs stepped up their hiring of foreign top executives during the period 2000-
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2005 (Ruigrok and Greve, 2008). Moreover, a study by the U.S. Conference Board found 
that successful global companies have multinational top management (Berman, 1997).  
Much of the existing literature has focused on explaining the composition of top 
management teams. For instance, Milliken and Martins (1996) argued that diversity in 
individual knowledge, skills and competences creates a broader resource and knowledge 
base within the team, which influences the quality of group decisions. Focusing on the 
team level of analysis, upper echelons theory suggests that the composition of the entire 
top management team, particularly in terms of heterogeneity in managers’ backgrounds, 
creates the basis for managerial decisions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In this study, 
however, we focus explicitly on the individual versus firm level predictors of the 
likelihood that a MNC will employ a foreign born national on their top management 
team. Rather than measuring nationality diversity as the proportion of foreigners on the 
top management team or the dispersion of executive nationalities, we use logistic multi-
level modeling to investigate the probability of finding a foreign executive on the top 
management team. Our main focus is on the drivers of the choice to employ a foreigner 
on the top management team and the degree to which this is a function of individual level 
human capital characteristics versus firm level strategic considerations. 
This study aims at contributing to the strategic management and international 
business literature by combining insights from internationalization and human capital 
theories in order to answer the question of why firms employ foreigners on their top 
management teams. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Human capital theory 
Studies have proved that human capital is the critical differentiator of a business’ success 
in a globalized economy (Ling and Jaw, 2006). In order to compete in the international 
arena, it is vital for a firm to possess firm-specific human capital (Schuler and Rogovsky, 
1998). Human capital refers to the investment undertaken by individuals in the form of 
education and training in skills. This capital provides a powerful signal to potential 
employers about the skills and capabilities of an individual and thus provides the basis on 
which labor markets operate. The TMT capital (skills, experiences and knowledge of top 
executives) is directly related to the ability of the TMT to gain access to resources and 
thus be effective in strategy making. To the extent that TMT capital is a function of the 
human capital of the individuals serving on the executive team, firms are likely to select 
executives with high human capital. Human capital may be separated into two types, 
general and specific (Becker, 1964).  
General human capital refers to qualities and experiences, such as age, educational 
level or professional qualifications, all of which should increase productivity. Individuals 
with experience and educational achievements provide a signal of possible future 
productivity benefits because of their proven skills and knowledge (Laing and Weir, 
1999). For instance, to the extent that individuals accumulate knowledge and skills during 
their working life, age can be regarded an indicator of the overall level of human capital. 
Moreover, professional qualifications, such as level and quality of education, are likely to 
enhance a person’s general human capital in the labor market and thus make her more 
attractive to a potential employer. The value of general human capital is particularly 
6 
 
important for executive appointments as the impact of hiring unqualified individuals to 
the top management team may be costly both in terms of individual contract termination 
and firm strategic and financial developments. In order to minimize these risks, firms are 
likely to put a premium on professional qualifications and experiences when selecting 
executives for their top management teams.   
Specific human capital refers to the accumulation of skills and knowledge necessary 
to perform a specific task. For instance, the number of years that an executive has held a 
position within the company may attest to this individual’s specific firm-related human 
capital (Hogan and McPheters, 1980). Other specific human characteristics that may 
influence the level of human capital include industry-specific experience and business 
education. An individual possessing experience within the same industry as the hiring 
firm is likely to bring industry-specific knowledge and skills, as well as network 
relations, which may help TMT strategic decision-making in the future. Hence, such 
experiences are likely to be positively associated with human capital of that individual. 
By the same token, having a business educational background is likely to provide 
additional human capital and be regarded an asset by business firms. 
Foreigners are typically more difficult and expensive than nationals to include on the 
top management team. Therefore, when employing a foreign executive on the top 
management team, firms are likely to look for an individual who is deemed highly 
qualified in terms of both general and specific human capital. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of having a foreign executive on the TMT is positively 
associated with his or her human capital. 
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Matching managers to strategy 
The adaptation of TMT composition as a response to corporate strategy has been 
extensively discussed in the upper echelons literature (Carpenter, Geletkanycz and 
Sanders, 2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). At the individual level of analysis, 
researchers have investigated the alignment of managerial characteristics with corporate 
strategy (Changanti and Sambharya, 1997; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Szilagyi and 
Schweiger, 1984) and the performance consequences of such fit (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984; Thomas, Litschert and Ramaswamy, 1991). At the team level of 
analysis, the underlying idea is that the higher the complexity of firm operations, the 
higher are the information-processing demands posed on the TMT (Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Similarly, the resource-dependence 
perspective suggests that the benefits of directors serving as boundary-spanners are 
contingent on the firm strategy (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000). Diversity in 
TMT members backgrounds and experiences brings to the firm relational capital 
(network contacts) as well as human capital (e.g. expertise, knowledge and skills) 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) that are essential for successful leadership of complex 
organizations. Keck and Tushman (1993) found that changes in environmental and 
organizational context trigger changes in the composition of the top management team.   
Foreign expansion and dispersion of international operations will lead to an increase 
in the amount of environmental complexity that the firm is facing (Stopford and Wells, 
1972). Companies may boost their ability to deal with challenges in the international 
environment by appointing members of the TMT with particular characteristics, skills, or 
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experiences that are sought after in the internationalization process (Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998).  The concept of matching managers to strategies (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984) is particularly critical in the context of internationalization, as many 
important facets of the international strategic capabilities of a company ultimately 
originate from the knowledge, skills and behaviors of top managers (Murtha, Lenway and 
Bagozzi, 1998). Internationalization is part of an organizational capability development 
cycle, in which firms generate knowledge about foreign markets by gradually entering 
new markets, thereby incrementally increasing their commitment to foreign operations 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). The composition of the upper echelons of a firm is 
therefore expected to change as the company reconfigures its international value-chain. 
The TMT play an important role in the handling of liability of foreignness (Zaheer,1996) 
issues, as TMT members decide on the foreign market entry location and strategy, 
facilitate the process of knowledge absorption and transfer, and exert control over the 
subsidiary staffing policy.  
While previous research has mostly focused on the international experience of the 
firm upper echelons (Athanassiou and Nigh; 2002; Carpenter and Frederickson, 2001; 
Carpenter et al., 2001; Sambharya, 1996), national origin is an important, yet under-
studied aspect of TMT international background and orientation. In the context of firm 
international strategy, TMT nationalities have implications not only for individual 
personalities and team dynamics but also for the strategic decision-making (Elron, 1997; 
Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996; Kilduff, Angelmar and Mehra, 2000). Nationality is a 
source of knowledge about a particular region or economy. Foreign-born TMT members 
posses valuable knowledge about economic and market factors and institutions as well as 
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about culture, behavior and norms of the country or region, from which they originate. 
Such knowledge may be invaluable in making decisions about a firm’s strategy in a 
particular country or region, as well as about international operations in general. Luo 
suggests that “foreign natives have natural advantages in processing information 
pertaining to their home countries and in finding solutions that improve information 
processing.” (2005: 34). Hence, firms are likely to view foreign top management team 
members as a valuable response to the additional challenges arising from firm 
internationalization: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of having a foreign executive on the TMT is positively 
associated with firm degree of internal diversification. 
 
Top management team and board characteristics 
The interdependence of top management teams and boards is an emergent theme in 
research on firm governance (Jensen and Zajac, 2004). The relationship between 
corporate boards and TMT composition can be explained through two main mechanisms. 
First, boards are assuming higher responsibilities and thus become more involved in the 
selection of TMT members. Recent research reports an increase in the use of board 
committees and provides evidence that the existence and composition of nomination 
committees have an impact on the heterogeneity of corporate boards (Ruigrok, Peck, 
Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). A professional board (or nomination committee) strives 
to match TMT composition to the requirements of the firm environment and strategy. In 
this process, managers’ background characteristics and experiences will be considered as 
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resources to link the firm to its environment. The same holds true when selecting board 
members (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salanczik, 1978; Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998). Hence, requisite variety law (Ashby, 1956) predicts that boards and 
TMTs are similar in their composition in that both governance bodies match the firm’s 
environment and strategy. Second, the attraction-selection-attrition cycles (Schenider, 
1983)  predict that certain types of corporate elites self-select themselves in particular 
settings and thus homo-social reproduction takes place not only within top management 
teams (Boone et al., 2004) but also between the board and the TMT. Top management 
teams attract executives who have similar backgrounds and cognitions to the existing 
TMT members. In the process of executive search, corporate boards choose managers 
who fit in the current profile of the top management team. At the same time, potential 
TMT members will feel attracted to and self-select into a management team and/or board 
of similar kind. Furthermore, when the newly selected executive is similar to and fits well 
in the existing top management team, he/she is more likely to sustain longer tenure.     
Foreign nationals serving on the board are likely to be better acquainted with the 
potential benefits of adding foreigners to the TMT and are more likely to look favorably 
on nationally diverse individuals when selecting new TMT members. Moreover, 
following the logic of the similarity – attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971) and attraction-
selection-attrition theory (Schenider, 1983), the characteristics of the top management 
team can be expected to reflect the composition of the board of directors and thus to the 
extent that the board has a high degree of nationality diversity it is likely to influence the 
composition of the TMT:  
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Hypothesis 3a: The likelihood of having a foreign executive on the TMT is positively 
associated with the degree of nationality diversity of the board. 
 
In lieu of having different nationalities represented on the board or TMT, international 
experience is a valuable source of knowledge and expertise about foreign markets and 
cultures (Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen, 2001; Johansson and Vahlne, 1977; Reuber 
and Fischer, 1997; Sambharya, 1996). Similar to nationally diverse boards, TMTs 
characterized by high degrees of international experience are likely to value the potential 
benefits brought with them by executives with different national backgrounds. Such 
TMTs are predisposed to nationally diverse ideas and given the interdependence between 
boards and TMTs mentioned above, it seems plausible that they will support and look 
favorably upon appointment of a foreigner to the TMT.  
Moreover, managers’ international experience facilitates access to international 
networks (Athanassiou & Nigh, 1999). These relational networks bring with them the 
potential knowledge of qualified top executives outside the home country. Such 
knowledge and access to qualified international executives may serve to reduce the 
inherent imperfect information and costs of liability of foreignness involved in attracting 
and hiring foreign nationals to the TMT.  
Thus, TMTs with high degrees of international experience are likely to look 
favorably upon members with different national backgrounds and help facilitate the 
initial contact to these individuals via their international network. To the extent that homo 
socio reproduction and the similarity-attraction paradigm operate within the TMT (Boone 
et al., 2004), we hypothesize:  
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Hypothesis 3b: The likelihood of having a foreign executive on the TMT is positively 
associated with degree of international experience of the TMT. 
 
METHOD 
Sample and data 
Switzerland is among the most competitive executive labor markets in Europe with 
the highest percentages of foreign top executives (Ruigrok and Greve, 2008), thus 
offering a suitable context for studying the factors influencing the choice of foreign 
national top executives. The initial sample of this study consists of all companies listed 
on the Swiss Stock Exchange (SWX) in September 2004. We  excluded (1) investments 
trusts, (2) companies with headquarters outside Switzerland, (3) companies that did not 
provide detailed information on their TMTs, and (4) companies for which the 
composition of the TMT is governed by national and cantonal laws (such as cantonal 
banks and state owned energy companies). We only used company records for which we 
had complete data on our explanatory variables. This resulted in a sample of 135 firms. 
Data on executive backgrounds was obtained from companies' annual reports and 
websites. Firm level information was obtained from annual reports as wells as the 
Worldscope and Datastream databases. Both individual and firm level data were collected 
for the year end of 2003. 
 
Variables and measures 
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Foreign executive nationality was recorded as the country of origin of the top 
executives as stated in the annual report and coded as one if the executive was non-Swiss 
and zero otherwise. We used a number of measures for general and specific human 
capital (Laing and Weir, 1999).  Executive age was measured as a continuous variable. 
Executive education was measured as a dummy variable that equals one if the executive 
has business education and zero otherwise. Educational level was coded as a categorical 
variable with four possible values (1) less than a bachelor degree; (2) less than a master 
degree; (3) less than a doctoral degree; and (4) doctoral degree. Elite education is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the executive has at least one of his/her degrees from a top 
school and zero otherwise. The definition of top school included University of St. Gallen, 
ETH Zurich and IMD as the elite Swiss management schools, the European CEMS 
Universities and the North American Ivey League schools. Professional experience was 
measured with the use of dummy variables. International experience was coded as one if 
the top executive had international assignment or full-time work experience from a 
foreign country and zero if he/she spent his/her entire career in Switzerland. Executive 
industry experience was coded as one if the top executive had previous work experience 
in the industry in which his/her current company operates and to zero otherwise.  
A number of different measures were used to aggregate the data to the team level. 
Simple ratio (percentage members out of the total number of team members) were 
calculated for the dummy variables TMT international experience. The degree of board 
nationality diversity based was measured by applying a Blau’s (1977) index. The Blau 
index is a measure of group heterogeneity, which is commonly used in top management 
team research (Carpenter, 2002; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) to aggregate data from 
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the individual to team level and captures the dispersion of team members across all 
possible categories of a certain dimension using the formula B = [1 - Σ (pi) 2], where p is 
the percentage of team members in the ith group (i.e. nationality). The higher the value of 
B, the greater is the heterogeneity on a particular variable. 
Similar to previous research (Hoskinsson, Hitt, Johnson and Moesel, 2003; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), we used the entropy measure of firm diversification 
(Palepu, 1985) to measure firm international diversification. The entropy measure is 
calculated with the formula Σ Pi ln(1/Pi)2 where P is the percentage of a geographic 
segment in sales of the total firm sales and (1/P) is used as a weight to account for the 
importance of each geographic segment in the total sales of a company. 
We controlled for a number of variables at individual, team and organizational level. 
We measured executive gender as a dummy variable equal to one if an executive was 
female and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we controlled for the possible correlation 
between certain executive functions and the probability of having a foreigner on the top 
management team. Using Hambrick’s (1981) distinction between output and throughout 
functions we measured executive output function as one if the executive’s responsibility 
were for sales and marketing or product development and zero otherwise. We further 
controlled for the top management team tenure of individual executives. Executive tenure 
was measured in months since a person became a member of the top management team. 
In the case were no specific month of appointment was stated in the annual report, 
January 1 of the indicated calendar year was assumed as a starting date. As the size of the 
top management team may influence the probability of having a foreign top executive, 
we controlled for top management team size was measured as the count number of top 
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executives as stated in the company annual report. Top management team tenure was 
measured as the median of the tenures of all TMT members. Median tenure is considered 
a better measure than the average team tenure as it is less affected by very short or very 
long individual tenures (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). As the existence of a board 
nomination committee may lead to more professional executive search and selection we 
controlled for the existence of board nomination committee measured as one if the 
company had one and with zero otherwise. We further controlled for firm size and 
product diversification. The entropy measure was used to calculate firm product 
diversification. Firm size was measured as the logarithm of firm sales similar to most 
previous studies in the field.   
  
Analytic strategy 
 Unlike most previous studies that use the top management team as the level of analysis, 
 we applied multilevel methodology which allows us to keep the measurement and 
analysis of the data at the level at which they are collected. The research design resulted 
in a nested hierarchical structure, where individuals are nested within top management 
teams and firms. This created a hierarchical data structure with two levels of random 
variation: variation between executives within firms (level 1), and variation between 
firms (level 2). Datasets with a nested structure that include unexplained variability at 
each level of nesting are usually not adequately represented by the probability model of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Instead, a hierarchical linear model, 
which is an extension of multiple regression to a model that includes nested random 
coefficients, is recommended (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). 
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In multilevel analysis it is important to pay due attention to the nested structure of the 
data and the lack of independence among observations in order to avoid drawing wrong 
conclusions about observed relationships (Klein, Dansereau and Hall, 1994). In particular 
it is important to avoid aggregation which leads to problems related to ecological fallacy 
(Robinson, 1950).  
To avoid these potential problems outlined above we used hierarchical linear 
modeling for two-level data (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon and du Toit, 2004). 
HLM2 conducts the statistical analysis at the level of theory and measurement of 
variables, while at the same time allowing the researcher to model the influence of 
different level factors on outcomes at the lowest level. A hierarchical linear model is 
defined by its statistical parameters: regression parameters (fixed effects) and variance 
components (random effects). Hypothesis testing is based on both: fixed effect results are 
interpreted like regression coefficients and are tested through t-tests; random effects are 
estimated through variance components and are tested through F-test statistics. As our 
dependent variable is a dichotomous, or binary, variable (whether an executive has a 
foreign nationality or not) we use a multilevel logistic regression (Snijders and Bosker, 
1999). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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We found no empirical support for hypothesis H1, as four of the five human capital 
characteristics (age, business education, elite education and industry experience) had no 
significant association with the probability of a top executive to be a foreign national. 
Furthermore, contrary to our prediction the level of executive education was negatively 
related to the likelihood of a top executive to be a foreigner (b=-.36, p < .05). This result 
may be due to the fact that many Swiss born executives have doctoral degrees whereas in 
other parts of the world a doctoral degree is only obtained by those who intend to stay in 
academia. The degree of international diversification was significantly positively 
associated with the likelihood to have a foreign executive (b=.60, p < .05), providing 
support for hypothesis H2a. Furthermore, we find that both board nationality diversity 
(b=2.09, p < .01) and TMT international experience (b=1.44, p < .05) are positively and 
significantly related to the likelihood of foreign executive nationality. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Over the last decade, the number of foreigners serving on top management teams has 
increased significantly in a number of European countries (Ruigrok and Greve, 2008, van 
Veen and Marsman, 2008). However, it is unclear whether this trend is a result of 
conscious firm level efforts to match their managers to firm internationalization strategy 
or a random outcome of selecting the best person for an executive position (regardless of 
nationality). While most previous research on this phenomenon has focused on firm and 
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country level predictors, this study accounts for the individual level human capital 
characteristics of executives as well. We identify two alternative explanations for why 
firms employ foreigners on their top management teams and test these propositions by 
applying a multilevel design and analysis. First, based on human capital theory, we model 
the likelihood of a top management team member being a foreigner as a function of 
his/her background characteristics and experiences (human capital). Second, following 
strategic fit logic, we explain the probability of having foreign top executives as a 
function of firm international diversification strategy. As such, this study is an initial 
exploration of individual and firm level antecedents of TMT internationalization. 
Our results lend support to the notion that highly international firms are more 
likely to have foreigners in their upper echelons (van Veen and Marsman, 2008; Staples, 
2007). At the same time, we find no evidence that foreign executives possess more 
valuable human capital compared to domestic executives. Whereas this does not suggest 
that foreign born executives do not add value to top management teams, it indicated that 
the likelihood of an executive to be a foreigner is not determined by his/her background 
and experiences. Together, these findings points to the particular importance that firms 
place on having foreign nationals on their top management teams in times of increased 
international competitive pressures. It is not that foreign nationals bring higher human 
capital per se rather firms seem to put a premium on foreign nationality as a source of 
competitive advantage in a globalized world. From an executive labor market 
perspective, foreign nationality is perceived as a valuable add-on to relevant managerial 
backgrounds and experiences. That is if a firm has a choice between domestic and foreign 
executives with similar qualifications, it is more likely to select a foreigner if the firm has 
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extensive foreign operations. At the same time, the probability of having a foreigner on 
the TMT is not merely a function of the firm internationalization strategy but also 
depends on the makeup of the existing TMT and the board. Our study reveals that 
foreigners are more likely to be members of TMTs with high levels of international 
experience. Furthermore, the higher the degree of nationality diversity on the board the 
more likely they will appoint a foreigner to the TMT. 
This study did not account for the role of compensation in the foreign executive 
selection process. Future research may seek to investigate whether foreign nationals are 
remunerated differently than domestic top executives and to what extent this has 
implications for the overall executive team compensation levels. Moreover, while this 
research focused on the individual and firm level predictors of the probability of having a 
foreigner on the TMT, additional costs of searching and selecting foreign nationals was 
not accounted for. It may be that identifying and attracting foreigners to the TMT is 
associated with additional costs that outweigh any potential benefits and thus foreigners 
are selected against based on information asymmetry. 
From an individual perspective, the present study indicates that executives 
searching for a TMT position abroad should target highly internationalized firms. To the 
extent that these executives meet the qualifications and requirements of the 
internationalized firms, they may be in a comparatively competitive position vis-à-vis 
domestic candidates as their foreign nationality is perceived as an asset beyond 
international experience. Moreover, when searching for a TMT position abroad, foreign 
candidates should look closely at the composition (international experiences and 
nationality) of the TMT as well as the board of directors. As labor markets become 
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increasingly global and executive search frequently transcend national borders, top 
management teams will become increasingly multinational. While this study has 
provided at least a partial explanation for the underlying mechanisms behind the selection 
of foreign top management team members, future research will have to investigate to 
what extent such nationally diverse top management teams perform better than purely 
domestic top management teams, as well as to what extent this difference varies with the 
degree of international diversification of the firm. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Variable  Mean  S.D.                                                    
Executive nationality  0.36  0.48  1.00    
Executive age  49.05  7.45  0.00  1.00    
Executive gender  0.02  0.15  0.09  ‐0.14  1.00    
Executive educational level  2.97  0.68  0.02  0.02  ‐0.09  1.00    
Executive elite education  0.35  0.48  ‐0.16  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.29  1.00    
Executive industry experience  0.55  0.5  ‐0.01  0.06  0.00  ‐0.01  0.04  1.00    
Executive tenure  59.53  65.4  ‐0.08  0.36  0.00  ‐0.10  ‐0.01  0.03  1.00    
Executive output function  0.11  0.31  0.04  ‐0.02  0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.09  ‐0.03  0.01  1.00    
Executive business education  0.48  0.5  ‐0.02  ‐0.11  0.01  ‐0.16  ‐0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  ‐0.11  1.00    
Nomination committee  0.5  0.5  0.04  0.15  ‐0.09  0.08  0.11  0.06  ‐0.04  0.00  0.04  1.00    
Board nationality diversity  0.29  0.24  0.36  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.02  0.07  ‐0.18  0.06  0.05  0.16  1.00    
Firm size  6.44  1.8  0.17  0.20  ‐0.07  0.07  0.12  0.03  ‐0.05  0.02  0.09  0.44  0.35  1.00    
Product diversification  0.78  0.48  0.06  0.08  ‐0.09  ‐0.03  0.08  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.04  0.04  0.21  0.14  0.41  1.00    
International diversification  0.89  0.55  0.22  0.10  ‐0.02  0.14  0.11  ‐0.03  ‐0.10  ‐0.01  ‐0.05  0.22  0.30  0.44  0.27  1.00    
TMT size  6.34  2.6  0.28  0.05  0.07  0.02  0.02  0.00  ‐0.06  0.03  ‐0.05  0.11  0.18  0.36  0.16  0.26  1.00    
TMT international experience  0.24  0.26  0.14  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.17  0.12  0.26  0.14  0.24  0.04  1.00    
TMT tenure  49.3  37.34  ‐0.08  0.16  ‐0.04  ‐0.05  0.01  ‐0.01  0.45  ‐0.01  ‐0.05  ‐0.09  ‐0.22  ‐0.06  ‐0.04  ‐0.10  ‐0.14  0.10  1.00 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
TABLE 2 
Results of Hierarchical Linear Model 
 
 
 
Variable     Coefficient  S.E. 
Intercept  G00  ‐1.51 ***  0.27
Nomination committee  G01  ‐0.16 0.33
Board nationality diversity  G02  2.09 **  0.69
Firm size  G03  ‐0.06 0.13
Product diversification  G04  ‐0.15 0.32
International diversification  G05  0.60 *  0.26
TMT size  G06  0.26 ***  0.06
TMT international experience  G07  1.44 *  0.62
TMT tenure  G08  0.00 0.00
Executive age  B1  0.02 0.02
Executive gender  B2  1.01 *  0.45
Executive educational level  B3  ‐0.36 *  0.17
Executive elite education  B4  ‐0.42 0.26
Executive industry experience  B5  ‐0.11 0.21
Executive tenure  B6  0.00 0.00
Executive output function  B7  ‐0.17 0.37
Executive business education  B8  ‐0.16    0.18
 
 
SMG – Working Papers 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
 
2003 
2003-1: Nicolai J. Foss, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova, and Torben Pedersen: 
Governing Knowledge Processes: Theoretical Foundations and Research 
Opportunities. 
2003-2: Yves Doz, Nicolai J. Foss, Stefanie Lenway, Marjorie Lyles, Silvia Massini, 
Thomas P. Murtha and Torben Pedersen: Future Frontiers in International 
Management Research: Innovation, Knowledge Creation, and Change in 
Multinational Companies. 
2003-3: Snejina Michailova and Kate Hutchings: The Impact of In-Groups and Out-
Groups on Knowledge Sharing in Russia and China CKG Working Paper. 
2003-4: Nicolai J. Foss and Torben Pedersen: The MNC as a Knowledge Structure: The 
Roles of Knowledge Sources and Organizational Instruments in MNC Knowledge 
Management CKG Working Paper. 
2003-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss and Xosé H. Vázquez-Vicente: “Tying the Manager’s 
Hands”: How Firms Can Make Credible Commitments That Make Opportunistic 
Managerial Intervention Less Likely CKG Working Paper. 
2003-6: Marjorie Lyles, Torben Pedersen and Bent Petersen: Knowledge Gaps: The Case 
of Knowledge about Foreign Entry. 
2003-7: Kirsten Foss and Nicolai J. Foss: The Limits to Designed Orders: Authority under 
“Distributed Knowledge” CKG Working Paper. 
2003-8: Jens Gammelgaard and Torben Pedersen: Internal versus External Knowledge 
Sourcing of Subsidiaries - An Organizational Trade-Off. 
2003-9: Kate Hutchings and Snejina Michailova: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing in 
Russian and Chinese Subsidiaries: The Importance of Groups and Personal 
Networks Accepted for publication in Journal of Knowledge Management. 
2003-10: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen and Markus Verzin: The Impact of Knowledge 
Management on MNC Subsidiary Performance: the Role of Absorptive Capacity 
CKG Working Paper. 
2003-11: Tomas Hellström and Kenneth Husted: Mapping Knowledge and Intellectual 
Capital in Academic Environments: A Focus Group Study Accepted for 
publication in Journal of Intellectual Capital  CKG Working Paper.  
2003-12: Nicolai J Foss: Cognition and Motivation in the Theory of the Firm: Interaction or 
“Never the Twain Shall Meet”? Accepted for publication in Journal des Economistes 
et des Etudes Humaines CKG Working Paper.  
2003-13: Dana Minbaeva and Snejina Michailova: Knowledge Transfer and Expatriation 
Practices in MNCs: The Role of Disseminative Capacity.  
2003-14: Christian Vintergaard and Kenneth Husted: Enhancing Selective Capacity 
Through Venture Bases.  
2004 
2004-1: Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge and Organization in the Theory of the Multinational 
Corporation: Some Foundational Issues 
2004-2: Dana B. Minbaeva: HRM Practices and MNC Knowledge Transfer  
2004-3: Bo Bernhard Nielsen and Snejina Michailova: Toward a Phase-Model of Global 
Knowledge Management Systems in Multinational Corporations 
2004-4: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J Foss: The Next Step in the Evolution of the RBV: 
Integration with Transaction Cost Economics 
2004-5: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Methodological Individualism and the 
Organizational Capabilities Approach 
2004-6: Jens Gammelgaard, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova: Knowledge-sharing 
Behavior and Post-acquisition Integration Failure 
2004-7: Jens Gammelgaard: Multinational Exploration of Acquired R&D Activities 
2004-8: Christoph Dörrenbächer & Jens Gammelgaard: Subsidiary Upgrading? Strategic 
Inertia in the Development of German-owned Subsidiaries in Hungary 
2004-9: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Resources and Transaction Costs: How the 
Economics of Property Rights Furthers the Resource-based View 
2004-10: Jens Gammelgaard & Thomas Ritter: The Knowledge Retrieval Matrix: 
Codification and Personification as Separate Strategies 
2004-11: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of 
the Firm: Any Gains from Trade? 
2004-12: Akshey Gupta & Snejina Michailova: Knowledge Sharing in Knowledge-Intensive 
Firms: Opportunities and Limitations of Knowledge Codification 
2004-13: Snejina Michailova & Kate Hutchings: Knowledge Sharing and National Culture: 
A Comparison Between China and Russia 
 
2005 
2005-1: Keld Laursen & Ammon Salter: My Precious - The Role of Appropriability 
Strategies in Shaping Innovative Performance 
2005-2: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A 
Stocktaking and Assessment 
2005-3: Lars Bo Jeppesen & Lars Frederiksen: Why Firm-Established User Communities 
Work for Innovation: The Personal Attributes of Innovative Users in the Case of 
Computer-Controlled Music  
2005-4: Dana B. Minbaeva: Negative Impact of HRM Complementarity on Knowledge 
Transfer in MNCs 
2005-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein & Sandra K. Klein: Austrian Capital 
Theory and the Link Between Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm 
2005-1: Nicolai J. Foss: The Knowledge Governance Approach 
2005-2: Torben J. Andersen: Capital Structure, Environmental Dynamism, Innovation 
Strategy, and Strategic Risk Management 
2005-3: Torben J. Andersen: A Strategic Risk Management Framework for Multinational 
Enterprise 
2005-4: Peter Holdt Christensen: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing: A Conceptual 
Framework 
2005-5 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Hands Off! How Organizational Design Can Make 
Delegation Credible 
2005-6 Marjorie A. Lyles, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: Closing the Knowledge Gap 
in Foreign Markets - A Learning Perspective 
2005-7 Christian Geisler Asmussen, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: How do we 
Capture “Global Specialization” when Measuring Firms’ Degree of 
internationalization? 
2005-8 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Simon on Problem-Solving: Implications for New 
Organizational Forms 
2005-9 Birgitte Grøgaard, Carmine Gioia & Gabriel R.G. Benito: An Empirical 
Investigation of the Role of Industry Factors in the Internationalization Patterns of 
Firms 
2005-10 Torben J. Andersen: The Performance and Risk Management Implications of 
Multinationality: An Industry Perspective 
2005-11 Nicolai J. Foss: The Scientific Progress in Strategic Management: The case of the 
Resource-based view 
2005-12 Koen H. Heimeriks: Alliance Capability as a Mediator Between Experience and 
Alliance Performance: An Empirical Investigation Into the Alliance Capability 
Development Process 
2005-13 Koen H. Heimeriks, Geert Duysters & Wim Vanhaverbeke: Developing Alliance 
Capabilities: An Empirical Study 
2005-14 JC Spender: Management, Rational or Creative? A Knowledge-Based Discussion 
 
2006 
2006-1: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Emergence of the Modern Theory of the Firm 
2006-2: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Individuals and Organizations: Thoughts on a 
Micro-Foundations Project for Strategic Management and Organizational 
Analysis 
2006-3: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen & Markus Venzin: Does Knowledge Sharing 
Pay? An MNC Subsidiary Perspective on Knowledge Outflows 
2006-4: Torben Pedersen: Determining Factors of Subsidiary Development 
 
2006-5 Ibuki Ishikawa: The Source of Competitive Advantage and Entrepreneurial 
Judgment in the RBV: Insights from the Austrian School Perspective 
2006-6 Nicolai J. Foss & Ibuki Ishikawa: Towards a Dynamic Resource-Based View: 
Insights from Austrian Capital and Entrepreneurship Theory 
2006-7 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss:  Entrepreneurship, Transaction Costs, and 
Resource Attributes  
2006-8 Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Original and Derived Judgement: 
An Entrepreneurial Theory of Economic Organization 
2006-9 Mia Reinholt: No More Polarization, Please! Towards a More Nuanced 
Perspective on Motivation in Organizations 
2006-10 Angelika Lindstrand, Sara Melen & Emilia Rovira: Turning social capital into 
business? A study of Swedish biotech firms’ international expansion 
2006-11 Christian Geisler Asmussen, Torben Pedersen & Charles Dhanaraj: Evolution of 
Subsidiary Competences: Extending the Diamond Network Model 
2006-12 John Holt, William R. Purcell, Sidney J. Gray & Torben Pedersen: Decision Factors 
Influencing MNEs Regional Headquarters Location Selection Strategies 
2006-13 Peter Maskell, Torben Pedersen, Bent Petersen & Jens Dick-Nielsen: Learning 
Paths to Offshore Outsourcing - From Cost Reduction to Knowledge Seeking 
2006-14 Christian Geisler Asmussen: Local, Regional or Global? Quantifying MNC 
Geographic Scope 
2006-15 Christian Bjørnskov & Nicolai J. Foss: Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurial 
Activity: Some Cross-Country Evidence 
2006-16 Nicolai J. Foss & Giampaolo Garzarelli: Institutions as Knowledge Capital: 
Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Interpretative Institutionalism 
2006-17 Koen H. Heimriks & Jeffrey J. Reuer: How to Build Alliance Capabilities 
2006-18 Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein, Yasemin Y. Kor & Joseph T. Mahoney: 
Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism, and the Resource – Based View: Towards a New 
Synthesis 
2006-19 Steven Globerman & Bo B. Nielsen: Equity Versus Non-Equity International 
Strategic Alliances: The Role of Host Country Governance 
 
2007 
2007-1 Peter Abell, Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Building Micro-Foundations for the 
Routines, Capabilities, and Performance Links  
2007-2 Michael W. Hansen, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: MNC Strategies and 
Linkage Effects in Developing Countries 
2007-3 Niron Hashai, Christian G. Asmussen, Gabriel R.G. Benito & Bent Petersen: 
Predicting the Diversity of Foreign Entry Modes 
2007-4 Peter D. Ørberg Jensen & Torben Pedersen: Whether and What to Offshore? 
2007-5 Ram Mudambi & Torben Pedersen: Agency Theory and Resource Dependency 
Theory: Complementary Explanations for Subsidiary Power in Multinational 
Corporations 
2007-6 Nicolai J. Foss: Strategic Belief Management 
2007-7 Nicolai J. Foss: Theory of Science Perspectives on Strategic Management Research: 
Debates and a Novel View 
2007-8 Dana B. Minbaeva: HRM Practices and Knowledge Transfer in MNCs 
2007-9 Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge Governance in a Dynamic Global Context: The Center 
for Strategic Management and Globalization at the Copenhagen Business School 
2007-10 Paola Gritti & Nicolai J. Foss: Customer Satisfaction and Competencies: An 
Econometric Study of an Italian Bank 
2007-11 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Organizational Governance 
2007-12 Torben Juul Andersen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: The Effective Ambidextrous 
Organization: A Model of Integrative Strategy Making Processes. 
 
2008 
2008-1 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss:  Managerial Authority When Knowledge is 
Distributed: A Knowledge Governance Perspective 
2008-2 Nicolai J. Foss: Human Capital and Transaction Cost Economics. 
2008-3 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship and Heterogeneous Capital. 
2008-4 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Need for an Entrepreneurial Theory of the 
Firm. 
2008-5 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship: From Opportunity Discovery 
to Judgment. 
2008-6 Mie Harder: How do Rewards and Management Styles Influence the Motivation 
to Share Knowledge? 
2008-7 Bent Petersen, Lawrence S. Welch & Gabriel R.G. Benito: Managing the 
Internalisation Process – A Theoretical Perspective.  
2008-8 Torben Juul Andersen: Multinational Performance and Risk Management Effects: 
Capital Structure Contingencies. 
2008-9 Bo Bernard Nielsen: Strategic Fit and the Role of Contractual and Procedural 
Governance in Alliances: A Dynamic Perspective. 
2008-10 Line Gry Knudsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Collaborative Capability in R&D 
Alliances: Exploring the Link between Organizational and Individual level 
Factors. 
2008-11 Torben Juul Andersen & Mahesh P. Joshi: Strategic Orientations of 
Internationalizing Firms: A Comparative Analysis of Firms Operating in 
Technology Intensive and Common Goods Industries. 
2008-12 Dana Minbaeva: HRM Practices Affecting Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation of 
Knowledge Receivers and their Effect on Intra-MNC Knowledge Transfer. 
2008-13 Steen E. Navrbjerg & Dana Minbaeva: HRM and IR in Multinational 
Corporations: Uneasy Bedfellows? 
2008-14 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Hayekian Knowledge Problems in Organizational 
Theory. 
2008-15 Torben Juul Andersen: Multinational Performance Relationships and Industry 
Context. 
2008-16 Larissa Rabbiosi: The Impact of Subsidiary Autonomy on MNE Knowledge 
Transfer: Resolving the Debate. 
2008-17 Line Gry Knudsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Organizational and Individual Level 
Antecedents of Procedural Governance in Knowledge Sharing Alliances. 
2008-18 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Understanding Opportunity Discovery and 
Sustainable Advantage: The Role of Transaction Costs and Property Rights. 
2008-19 
 
2008-20 
Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Social Reality, The Boundaries of Self-fulfilling 
Prophecy, and Economics. 
Yves Dos, Nicolai J. Foss & José Santos: A Knowledge System Approach to the 
Multinational Company: Conceptual Grounding and Implications for Research 
2008-21 Sabina Nielsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Why do Firms Employ foreigners on Their
Top Management Teams? A Multi-Level Exploration of Individual and Firm 
Level Antecedents 
 
 
